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ABSTRACT
The	political	economy	shaped	the	ownership	structure	of	corporations	in	
Malaysia.	The	rapid	growth	of	the	economy	has	not	diluted	the	concentrated	
ownership	structure	in	the	Malaysian	firms.	Malaysia	has	its	own	unique	
feature	of	ownership	structured	firms	which	can	be	divided	into	politically	
connected	(PCON)	firms,	institutional	ownership	and	managerial	ownership	
(INST&MGRL)	firms,	and	family	ownership	(FAMILY)	firms.	The	purpose	
of	this	paper	is	to	investigate	whether	PCON,	INST&MGR	and	FAMILY	
firms	are	associated	with	higher	audit	fees.	This	study	also	examines	the	
association	between	audit	committee	characteristics	IND,	DIL	and	EXP	and	
audit	fees	based	on	the	revamped	Bursa	Listing	Requirements	in	2008,	which	
focus	on	audit	committee	characteristics.	Using	data	from	567	firm-year	
observations	from	years	2008	to	2010,	we	find	that	PCON	firms	pay	higher	
audit	fees	than	INST&MGRL	and	FAMILY	firms.	Further,	the	association	
between	audit	committee	IND,	DIL	and	EXP	and	audit	fees	is	positive	and	
significant	for	PCON	firms,	suggesting	that	the	government	intervention	
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is	expected	to	produce	better	governance	and	improve	the	firm’s	business	
performance.	This	is	because	the	government	has	given	much	attention	and	
initiatives	to	ensure	that	these	firms	perform	in	an	effective	way	and	assist	
the	government	to	improve	the	economic	growth.
Keywords:	audit	fees,	audit	committee,	corporate	governance,	political	
connections
INTRODUCTION
Malaysia offers clearly identifiable capital segments which are divided 
into different types of ownership structures. This division can be observed 
and categorised into institutional ownership and managerial ownership 
(INST&MGRL) firms, family ownership (FAMILY) firms and politically 
connected (PCON) firms. Institutional ownership under the Malaysian 
corporate sector is one of the ownership structures that is being shared 
amongst the East Asian economies such as Indonesia, Thailand, Singapore 
and Korea (Sulong & Mat Nor, 2008). It represents approximately 13 per 
cent of the total market capitalisation of Bursa Malaysia (Abdul Wahab et	
al., 2009). In addition, firms with managerial ownership are also common 
amongst Malaysian listed firms. Claessens et	 al. (2000) estimates that 
approximately 85 per cent of Malaysian listed firms are owner managed, 
at the 20% cut-off of control right. Jensen and Meckling (1976) observe 
that as management ownership increases, their interests are more aligned 
with that of the owners and thus, the need for intense monitoring by the 
board decreases. Managerial ownership needs to be restricted because high 
managerial ownership results in managers having high personal interests, 
so that managers do not act in the best interest of the company, but for 
their self-interest (Setiadi et	al., 2016).  Family controlled firm or family 
ownership is another common form of business organisation. A stream 
of literature explains that family ownership is central in most countries 
(Ibrahim & Samad, 2011). Malaysia has its own unique feature of politically 
connected firms or favoured firms, given the close link between selected 
large firms or conglomerates and the government. Market economists have 
argued that firms in the hands of the government are inferior in performance 
compared to firms in private hands (Boycko et	 al., 1996b; Shleifer & 
Vishny, 1998; Dewenter & Malatesta, 2001). This argument arises due to 
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their institutional relationship with the government, the market structure 
in which they operate, or the management systems applied within them 
(Shleifer & Vishny, 1998). It is supported by the political embeddedness 
perspective emphasising that such connections provides opportunities to 
gain access to valuable resources (Okhmatovskiy, 2010). These favoured 
firms’ political linkages influence the accumulation and concentration of 
wealth in Malaysian business (Gomez & Jomo, 1999). Thus, high level of 
government equity ownership was then seen as a challenge in enhancing 
good corporate governance in Malaysia (World Bank, 2005). 
Malaysia has made significant progress in developing an efficient and 
well-regulated capital and financial market, as well as strengthening the 
institutional framework for the regulation of the accounting and auditing 
profession (World Bank, 2012). Good progress has been achieved in 
improving the quality and consistency of corporate financial reporting and 
corporate governance for listed firms. For instance, the revised Malaysian 
Code of Corporate Governance (MCCG) 2007 called for increased 
interactions between audit committee and internal audit functions. To ensure 
that audit committee serves as an effective check on the management of a 
firm, the Bursa Malaysia Listing Requirements (BMLR) was amended in 
2008 to provide for the composition of audit committees, the frequency of 
meetings and the need for audit committee members to attend continuous 
training to keep abreast with developments in relevant financial and other 
related developments. With the continuous improvement on corporate 
governance practices, PCON firms are perceived to have better corporate 
governance practices and it is envisaged that these firms will reinforce this 
mind-set of continuous improvement in their day-to-day operations. This 
is important because Malaysian PCON firms were once perceived to be 
associated with higher business risk and poor performance. Hence, firms 
with good corporate governance attributes demand higher audit quality, 
resulting in higher external audit fees. Due to the above arguments, this 
study extends the audit fee literature to examine the relation between the 
enhanced internal governance mechanisms after the revision of BMLR 2008, 
specifically, audit committee independence, diligence and expertise, and 
audit fees amongst INST&MGRL firms, FAMILY firms and PCON firms.
Prior studies on PCON firms have generally drawn on the supply based 
perspective.  Additionally, these studies have also examined the relationships 
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between corporate governance and audit fees for PCON firms before Bursa 
Malaysia revised listing requirements in 2008 (for example, Abbott, 2003; 
Gul, 2006; Yatim et	al., 2006). To date, no study has examined the audit fee 
phenomenon subsequent to the enhanced reforms in 2008. It is important 
to investigate whether the enhanced corporate governance rules impact the 
PCON and other ownership structured firms differently.
The reminder of this paper is structured as follows. The next section 
provides a review of literature and hypotheses development. The third 
section describes the research design while the results and discussions are 
reported in the fourth section. The final section presents conclusions of the 
study.
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES 
DEVELOPMENT
It is generally accepted that selected large firms or conglomerates in Malaysia 
have close link with the government. As a result of the government’s policy 
to increase Bumiputra equity ownership (Gomez & Jomo, 1999), selected 
Malays become politically involved in business and have more personal 
connections with the politicians (Gul, 2006; Johnson & Mitton, 2003). They 
have close connection with individuals who exert political power in the 
government and has given firms political influence (Faccio, 2006; Johnson & 
Mitton, 2003; Riahi-Belkaoui, 2004). Johnson and Mitton (2003) argue that 
the relationships between entrepreneurs and politicians in Malaysia are based 
on ‘chance personal histories’. They find the PCON firms to have negative 
impact on firm performance during the Asian Financial Crisis 1997. They 
provide insights that stock returns of PCON firms were lower in comparison 
with other ownership structured firms. They observe that PCON firms also 
suffered the most during the early stages of the Asian Financial Crisis when 
the government was unable to implement capital controls. However, once 
capital controls were imposed, the returns of these favoured firms were 
higher on average (Johnson & Mitton, 2003). During the pre-2007 period, 
Gul (2006) find a greater increase in audit fees for PCON firms than for 
other ownership structured firms, suggesting a supply-side explanation for 
audit fees. Abdul Wahab et	al. (2009) find a positive relationship between 
institutional ownership and audit fees and they too found that the audit fees 
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are higher for PCON firms during the pre-2007 period. In addition, a study 
by Sherliza and Nur Farha (2015) show a significant positive relationship 
between audit fees and firms with larger foreign ownership and government 
ownership but no significant relationship with firms with higher managerial 
ownership. Amir (2014) found that family ownership firms pay fewer 
fees for the audit work. Khan et	al. (2011) provide further evidence with 
regards to ownership structure; companies with institutional ownerships 
have a significant negative relationship with audit fees and will pay lower 
audit fees. Suggesting that companies which are dominated by institutional 
ownerships will pay lower audit fees.
 However, no studies have been reported to date on the impact of the 
BMLR 2008 on audit fees for PCON and other ownership structured firms. 
Based on prior literature for pre-2007 period and the arguments presented 
above, we propose the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: PCON firms pay higher audit fees than 
INST&MGRL and FAMILY firms post BMLR2008.
Past literature has put forward the idea that an independent audit 
committee is an effective monitor as it is not part of the management and 
has no financial interest in the firm. This is because the board and audit 
committee are in place to monitor the management who otherwise may 
act in their best personal interest and not the interest of their principal 
(Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Due to the separation 
of ownership and control, the agency theory also views managers as self-
interested actors who could engage in opportunistic behaviour (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). Consistent with the risk-based approach, an independent 
audit committee leads to an effective audit committee oversight of the 
financial reporting process which reduces the incidence of financial reporting 
issues (Abbott et	al., 2004; BRC, 1999; Dechow et	al., 1996; McMullen, 
1996). Thus, it is not surprising that Abbott et	al. (2003) and Vafeas and 
Waegelein (2007) find that audit committee independence has a significant 
positive impact on audit fees when the audit committee is made up of either 
solely or a majority of independent members. It also lends support that an 
independent audit committee is connected with higher audit fees due to 
greater demand for audit quality in order to protect its members’ reputation 
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(Abbott & Parker, 2000; Carcello & Neal, 2000). Thus, this study expects 
that audit committee independence contributes to higher audit fees. Since 
PCON firms aim at enhancing corporate governance, it is hypothesized that 
their audit committee members should be more independent and provides 
superior oversight over financial reporting process. As the firms require 
more extensive audit testing, higher external audit fees are expected. 
Therefore, the foregoing argument leads to the following hypothesis stated 
in an alternate form:
Hypothesis 2a: The association between audit committee 
independence and audit fees is stronger for PCON firms than 
INST&MGRL and FAMILY firms post BMLR2008
Past studies and governance best practices called for audit committees 
to be diligent in carrying out their duties (Abbot et	 al., 2004). Further, 
according to Yatim et	al. (2006), frequent audit committee meetings can 
reduce the tendency for financial reporting problems as they provide a 
forum for the audit committee and internal auditor to exchange relevant 
and important information and also allow the audit committee to notify the 
auditor of issues that require greater attention from the auditor (Raghunandan 
et	al., 1998). As found by Kalbers and Fogarty (1998) and Goodwin and 
Kent (2006), audit committees that meet frequently are more likely to be 
better informed and more diligent in discharging their responsibilities. As 
such, it is reasonable to expect that audit committees who meet frequently 
will demonstrate greater diligence in performing their duties. Consequently, 
as supported by Yatim et	al.	(2006) external audit fees are positively and 
significantly related to the frequency of audit committee meetings. Studies 
by Carcello et	al.	(2002) and Abbott et	al. (2003) which are consistent with 
the demand approach, argue that more diligent audit committee is likely to 
seek higher quality audits from external auditors, resulting in higher audit 
fees. This supports prior research (Yatim et	al., 2006; Carcello et	al., 2002; 
Abbott et	al., 2003) which determined that diligent audit committee will 
seek higher quality audits from external auditor resulting in higher audit 
fees, and conjectures the next hypothesis.
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Hypothesis 2b: The association between audit committee 
diligence and audit fees is stronger for PCON firms than 
INST&MGRL and FAMILY firms post BMLR2008. 
Having a financial expert on the board helps when reviewing the 
internal audit proposals (Read & Raghunandan, 2001) and investigating 
accounting irregularities. Moreover, past experience and knowledge in 
accounting and auditing enhances the accuracy of the investigation and 
produces better financial reporting quality. DeZoort and Salterio (2001) 
find that audit committee’s professional judgements on auditor-management 
issues pertaining to accounting policy differed between those with and 
without accounting and auditing knowledge.  
As such, Sharma et	al. (2009) reveal that audit committee accounting 
experts and independent directors play an important role in monitoring by 
demanding frequent audit committee meetings when management adopts 
aggressive accounting practices. Further, Gendron and Bedard (2006) 
reveal that an audit committee who is financially literate is more effective in 
adhering to best practices, and to secure a high quality of reported earnings. 
Thus, the more experts there are in the audit committee, the better will be 
the monitoring and adherence to best practices. According to Abbott et	al.	
(2003), audit committee financial expertise has a significant positive impact 
on audit fees. Yatim et	al. (2006) find a significant and positive association 
between audit committee expertise (proportion of audit committee members 
with accounting and finance qualifications) and audit fees. This is because 
a financially literate and knowledgeable audit committee will demand 
audit quality as the members are knowledgeable on technical auditing 
issues, and hence the increase in audit fees. As PCON firms are expected 
to adopt stronger governance which includes having an audit committee 
with financial expertise, it is hypothesized as follows:
Hypothesis 2c: The association between audit committee 
expertise and audit fees is stronger for PCON firms than 
INST&MGRL and FAMILY firms post BMLR2008
Based on the above hypotheses, the model is schematically described 
as follows:
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Figure 1: Research Model
RESEARCH METHOD
Data Collection
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  Table 1: Frequency of Ownership Structured Firms
Frequency Percentage
Politically Connected Firms 68
Non-Politically Connected Firms: 171 36%
Family Ownership Firms 65 64%
Institutional Ownership Firms &
Managerial Ownership Firms
56 34%
30%
189 100%
                                                                                                      
Audit Fee Model
The dependent variable that is the audit fees, is measured by the 
Ringgit	Malaysia (RM) value of the audit fee paid by the audit client 
firm. The main experimental variables are audit committee characteristics 
namely audit committee independence (IND), diligence (DIL) and expertise 
(EXP). Audit fees models employed in past research have used a variety 
of variables to control sectional differences which are primarily influenced 
by size, complexity and risk of the audit client (Simunic, 1980; Craswell, 
1992; Gul & Tsui, 1998; Francis, 1984; Chan et	al., 1993). Prior studies 
have found that the most significant determinant of audit fees is the size of 
the auditee, which is usually measured by total assets (TA) (Craswell, 1992; 
Palmrose, 1986; Simunic, 1980; Turpen, 1990). Non-audit fees (NAF) are 
also included as a control variable because it is significantly associated with 
audit fees (Whisenant et	al., 2003; Hay et	al., 2006). Further, the number 
of business segments (SEG) has been previously used to control for audit 
complexity (Simunic, 1980; Hackenbrack & Knechel, 1997). Zmijewski 
score (ZFC) is computed for each firm to control for financial crises. As 
profitability has also been argued to influence audit fees (Chan et	al., 1993), 
a negative relationship between return on assets (ROA) and audit fees is 
predicted. A fee premium exists for Big4 audit firms (Francis & Simon, 
1987), and it is expected that client firms of Big4 purchase a higher level 
of audit quality. Finally, an indicator variable equals to ‘1’ if PCON firms 
and ‘0’ if otherwise is tested. 
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Descriptive Analysis
The analysis includes the univariate test and One-Way Anova with 
post-hoc test between the audit fees and audit committee characteristics. 
Table 2 shows univariate analysis for the continuous and indicator variables. 
It represents sample for PCON, INST&MGRL and FAMILY firms, with the 
descriptive statistic of mean, standard deviation and median. The descriptive 
statistics show that PCON firms are bigger in terms of total assets and have 
a larger number of business segments (SEG). The PCON firms also have 
higher non-audit fees and a higher audit quality. In general, PCON firms 
have higher average audit fees than INST&MGRL and FAMILY firms. 
As expected, the sample firms’ audit committee characteristics IND, DIL 
and DIL record higher scores for PCON firms. It shows that the PCON 
firms are complying with the amended BMLR 2008 on audit committee 
characteristics. This is consistent with past studies (Abdul Wahab et	al., 
2011; Chan et	al., 1993; Collier & Gregory, 1996; O’Sullivan, 1999 and 
2000; Carcello et	al., 2002) that document higher audit fees for firms with 
improved governance, which is in line with the demand side explanation. 
Table 2: Univariate Analysis for Sample Firms (n = 567)
PCON  Firms (n=204) FAMILY    (n=195) INST&MGRL (n=168)
Variable Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev      Mean Std. Dev
LAF 12.63 1.07 11.72 0.81 11.92 0.83
AF 739045.69 1727857.350 189890.49 371583.93 216048.51 248825.79
 LTA 14.31 1.51 12.78 1.06 13.11 1.32
TA 5945714.89 11669897.66 690219.490 1235117.63 1839621.10 5107855.01
 LNAFº 8.25 8.01 2.13 10.49 2.23 10.65
NAF 461066.97 1324152.27 33455.29 69257.86 64752.97 245056.72
SEG 3.40 1.73 2.73 1.33 3.17 1.65
ZFC -2.99 0.86 -3.27 0.85 -2.91 0.89
ROA 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.07
AQ 0.79 0.41 0.63 0.47 0.62 0.49
IND 0.97 0.09 0.98 0.71 0.96 0.12
DIL 5.63 2.33 4.80 0.88 5.11 1.32
EXP 1.47 0.67 1.35 0.64 1.43 0.55
*p < 0.05; © chi-square tests ºObservations having a zero for LNAF are re-coded 
to a small positive value (0.00001) to enable a logarithmic transformation.
Notes:  AF is audit fees while LAF is natural logarithm of audit fees; TA is total 
assets (in RM) while LTA is natural logarithm of total assets; NAF is non-audit 
fees (in RM) while LNAF is natural logarithm of non-audit fees; SEG is the 
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number of business segments; ZFC is the Zmijewski score for financial crisis; 
ROA is net profit before tax over total assets; AQ an indicator variable equals 
to ‘1’ if the firm hires Big4 auditor and ‘0’ if otherwise; IND is the proportion of 
independent non-executive directors to audit committee; DIL is the number of 
meetings; EXP is the number of audit committee with accounting or finance 
qualification.
Model Specification
The study examines the moderating effects of political connections 
on audit committee (AC) characteristics and audit fees. Drawing from 
Craswell and Francis, (1999), Tsui et	al.	(2001), and Carcello et	al. (2002), 
the following audit fee model is used to test the Hypotheses (refer Table 3).
LAF = β₀ + β₁TA + β₂NAF + β₃SEG + β₄ZFC + β₅ROA + ß₆AQ + 
ß₇INST&MGRL + β₈FAMILY + β₉IND + β₁₀DIL + β₁₁EXP + β₁₂IND_PCON 
+ β₁₃DIL_PCON + β₁₄EXP_PCON + ε,
Table 3: Measurement of Independent and Dependent Variables
Hypotheses Dependent
Variable
Exp
Sign
Measurement of Variables
AF Audit fee paid by the client 
(Natural logarithm of audit fees 
used in regression model).
AC Characteristics Experimental 
Variables
Measurement of variables
IND + The proportion of independent 
non-executive directors to AC.
DIL + Number of AC meetings.
EXP + Number of AC with accounting 
or finance qualification.
Control 
Variables
Measurement of variables
TA + Total assets for client at the 
end of fiscal year (Natural 
logarithm of TA).
NAF + Total non-audit fee paid by 
client (Natural logarithm of 
NAF).
SEG + Number of business segments.
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ZFC + Zmijewski scores for financial 
crisis.
ROA - Profit before tax over TA.
AQ + An indicator variable equals to 
‘1’ if the firm hires Big4 auditor 
and ‘0’ if otherwise.
Hypothesis 1 INST&MGRL - An indicator variable, ‘1’ for 
INST&MGRL, with reference to 
PCON and ‘0’ if otherwise.
Hypothesis 1 FAMILY - As an indicator variable, ‘1’ 
for FAMILY, with reference to 
PCON and ‘0’ if otherwise.
Hypothesis 2a IND_PCON  - Interaction between IND and 
PCON
Hypothesis 2b DIL_PCON    - Interaction between DIL and 
PCON
Hypothesis 2c EXP_PCON - Interaction between EXP and 
PCON
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
 One-Way ANOVA with Post-Hoc Tests 
Table 4 shows one-way between-groups ANOVA test results for the 
three groups namely, the PCON firms, INST&MGRL firms and FAMILY 
firms. A one-way between-groups analysis of variance was conducted to 
compare the variance (variability in scores) between the three groups, as 
measured by the ownership structure. The analytical procedure is applied 
to answer the first hypothesis as to whether PCON firms pay higher audit 
fees than INST&MGRL and FAMILY firms. The above results generally 
show significant differences for the three groups except for ROA and audit 
committee EXP. There was a statistically significant difference at the p<0.01 
level in AF scores for the three groups (F=87.89, p=0.000). The actual 
difference in the mean scores between the groups was large. The post-hoc 
comparisons using the Tukey test indicates that the mean score for AF for 
PCON firms (µ=RM 654,881.40, SD=RM 1,474,057.76) is significantly 
different from FAMILY firms (µ=RM165,140.96, SD=RM 303,254.03) and 
INST&MGRL firms (µ=RM 182,359.10 SD=RM 193,699.48), respectively.
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From the table, it shows that PCON firms have the highest audit fees 
in comparison with the other two groups, thus fully support Hypothesis 
1. This indicates that PCON firms demand for substantive audit testing 
and improve audit quality from external auditors and are willing to pay 
higher audit fees. This is supported by Sherliza and Nurul Farha (2015) 
that foreign and government ownership will lead to higher audit fees paid 
to external auditors. According to them, government ownership is very 
strong in influencing the audit fees. The audit committee IND is significant 
at one per cent level (F=16.48 p=0.00) for all groups. The PCON firms 
have the highest IND mean score of 91 per cent (INST&MGRL = 84%, 
FAMILY = 87%). It indicates that the PCON firms have higher percentage 
of audit committee members who are independent non-executive directors. 
Similarly, audit committee DIL is also significant at one per cent level of 
significance (F=20.38 p=0.000) for all groups. The post-hoc comparisons 
test indicates that the mean score for PCON firms (µ=5.53 SD=2.21) is 
significantly different from INST&MGRL (µ= 4.94 SD=1.13) and FAMILY 
firms (µ=4.80 SD=1.01). 
It can be further concluded that the audit committee members in 
PCON firms conduct an average of 5.5 meetings in a year. In comparison, 
INST&MGRL and FAMILY firms conduct an average of 4.94 and 4.80 
meetings in a year, respectively. However, there is no significant difference 
for audit committee EXP between the groups. Similarly, given the F-statistic 
value of 38.65 with a significant level of p=0.000, the NAF is statistically 
significant for all groups. The post-hoc comparisons test indicated that the 
mean score for PCON firms (µ= RM 403790.66 SD= RM 1056255.03) 
is significantly different from INST&MGRL (µ= RM 59406.54 SD= RM 
196056.76) and FAMILY (µ= RM 27392.41 SD= RM 54516.02) firms. 
The client size measured by total assets (TA) is statistically significant for 
all groups, with PCON firms having the largest total assets (F=5817479.97 
SD=12320223.66). Additionally, comparable evidence of significance was 
noted for business segments (SEG) at one per cent level of significance for 
all groups. The post-hoc comparisons test indicated that the mean score 
for all groups are significantly different from each other. The financial 
crisis index (ZFC) is significant and differ significantly from each group, 
with INST&MGRL firms experiencing higher financial distress during the 
financial crisis. 
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Table 4: One-way between Groups ANOVA with Post-Hoc Tests (n = 567)
Variable Mean SD F-stat Mean 
Differences
p-value
LAF PCON INST&MGRL 
FAMILY
12.49 1.08 87.89        P>IM 
P>F
0.000***
INST&MGRL PCON  
FAMILY
11.77 0.79 IM<P
FAMILY PCON 
INST&MGRL
11.61 0.78 F<P
AF PCON INST&MGRL 
FAMILY
654881.40 1474057.76 30.89 P>IM
P>F
0.000***
INST&MGRL PCON FAMILY 182359.10 193699.48       IM<P 
FAMILY PCON 
INST&MGRL
165140.96 303254.03 F<P
LTA PCON INST&MGRL 
FAMILY
14.28 1.50 137.54 P>IM
       P>F 
0.000***
INST&MGRL PCON FAMILY 12.99        1.29 IM<P
IM>F
FAMILY PCON 
INST&MGRL
12.68 1.06 F<P
      F<IM 
TA PCON INST&MGRL 
FAMILY
5817479.97 12320223.6 43.71 P>IM
P>F
 
0.000***
INST&MGRL PCON FAMILY 1431606.96 3978752.80 IM<P
IM>F
FAMILY PCON 
INST&MGRL
634630.40 1091172.92 F<P
      F<IM 
LNAF PCON INST&MGRL 
FAMILY
7.54 8.81 38.65        P>IM 
P>F
0.000***
INST&MGRL PCON FAMILY 1.23 10.82       IM<P 
FAMILY PCON 1.81 10.48 F<P
INST&MGRL
NAF PCON INST&MGRL 
FAMILY
403790.66 1056255.03 34.99       P>IM 
P>F
0.000**
INST&MGRL PCON FAMILY 59406.54 196056.76 IM<P
FAMILY PCON
INST&MGRL
27392.41 54516.02 F<P
P>IM
SEG PCON INST&MGRL 
FAMILY
3.40 1.72 16.28 P>IM
P>F
0.000**
INST&MGRL PCON FAMILY 3.17 1.64 IM>F
FAMILY PCON
INST&MGRL
2.72 1.32 F<P
F<IM
ROA PCON INST&MGRL 
FAMILY
0.05 0.06 1.92 0.16
INST&MGRL PCON FAMILY 0.05 0.06
FAMILY PCON
INST&MGRL
0.06 0.05
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AQ PCON INST&MGRL 
FAMILY
0.79 0.40 13.10 P>IM
P>F
0.01***
INST&MGRL PCON FAMILY 0.64 0.48 IM<P
FAMILY PCON
INST&MGRL
0.62 0.48 F<P
F<IM
ZFC PCON INST&MGRL 
FAMILY
-2.94 0.84 11.39 P<F 0.00***
INST&MGRL PCON FAMILY -2.96 0.88 IM<F
FAMILY PCON
INST&MGRL
-3.23 0.84 F>P
F>IM
IND PCON INST&MGRL 
FAMILY
0.91 0.13 16.48 P>IM
P>F
0.00***
INST&MGRL PCON FAMILY 0.84 0.18 IM>P
FAMILY PCON
INST&MGRL
0.87 0.15 F<P
DIL PCON INST&MGRL 
FAMILY
5.53 2.21 20.38 P>IM
P>F
0.00***
INST&MGRL PCON FAMILY 4.94 1.13 IM<P
FAMILY PCON
INST&MGRL
4.80 1.01 F<P
EXP PCON INST&MGRL 
FAMILY
1.41 0.64 1.08 0.33
INST&MGRL PCON FAMILY 1.41 0.57
FAMILY PCON
INST&MGRL
1.35 0.62
***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.1.
P: Politically connected firms IM: Institutional ownership and Managerial 
ownership firms      F: Family ownership firms      
ºObservations having a zero for LNAF are re-coded to a small positive value 
(0.00001) to enable a logarithmic transformation. 
Notes:  AF is audit fees while LAF is natural logarithm of audit fees; TA is total 
assets (in RM) while LTA is natural logarithm of total assets; NAF is non-audit 
fees (in RM) while LNAF is natural logarithm of non-audit fees; SEG is the 
number of business segments; ZFC is the Zmijewski score for financial crisis; 
ROA is net profit before tax over total assets; AQ an indicator variable equals 
to ‘1’ if the firm hires Big4 auditor and ‘0’ if otherwise; IND is the proportion of 
independent non-executive directors to audit committee; DIL is the number of 
meetings; EXP is the number of audit committee with accounting or finance 
qualification.
Table 5 represents the multiple regression results for testing hypotheses 
2a, 2b and 2c. In testing the validity of the models used in the study, the 
traditional audit fee model introduced by Simunic (1980) is employed 
whereby the natural log of audit fees is regressed on control (Simunic, 1980; 
Yatim et	al., 2006; Gul, 2006; Ferguson, 2005) and experimental variables. 
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Results in Models A, B and C are significant at one per cent significant level 
(p=0.000), with an adjusted R² of at least 79.9 per cent which is comparable 
with other Malaysian studies in this area (Yatim et	al., 2006; Abdul Wahab 
et	al., 2011). Model A shows the association between external audit fees on 
8 control variables derived from the extant literature (Abbott et	al., 2003, 
Goodwin & Kent, 2006; Yatim et	al., 2006; Abdul Wahab et	al., 2009). 
The client size (TA) coefficient (0.03, t=1.51) is positive and significant at 
one per cent significant level indicating that the larger the size of firms, the 
higher the audit fees charged. The coefficient (0.06, t=2.45) on NAF is also 
positive and significant at one per cent significant level. Besides that, SEG, 
ZFC and ROA indicate a positive and significant relationship at	p=0.05, 
p=0.14 and p=-0.03, respectively. It indicates that as the complexity and risk 
are higher, the audit fees also increase. AQ is also positive and significant 
at p<0.05. Further, the ownership structure grouping variable coefficient 
is negative and significant at p=0.02 and p=0.05 for INST&MGRL and 
FAMILY firms, respectively. The unstandardised coefficient beta of -0.02 
and -0.15 for INST&MGRL and FAMILY firms indicate that the audit fees 
is lower for these firms compared to the PCON firms, provided that other 
predictors are constant. 
     Table 5(a): Audit Fee Regression Models (n =567)
Model A Model B
Variable Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value
Constant      35.81 33.12
LTA  0.44 17.70***  0.42 17.79***
TA  0.03 1.51***  0.05 2.65***
LNAF 0.08 4.51**  0.06 3.93***
NAF        0.06     2.45**  0.08 3.65***
SEG 0.05 2.98***  0.05 3.31***
ZFC 0.14 5.59***  0.14 5.90***
ROA  -0.03 -1.53       -0.04  -2.12***
AQ  0.05     3.16**        0.06  4.04***
INST&MGRL -0.02    -1.23** -0.02 -1.59**
FAMILY -0.05    -2.57** -0.05 -3.13***
IND  0.04 3.21***
DIL  0.07 4.41***
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EXP  0.02 1.24*
F-Statistics 231.27 257.26
p-value 0.00 0.00
Adj. R² 0.79 0.82
p < 0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01                      
 ºObservations having a zero for LNAF are re-corded to a small positive value 
(0.00001) to enable a logarithmic transformation.
Notes:  AF is audit fees while LAF is natural logarithm of audit fees; TA is total 
assets (in RM) while LTA is natural logarithm of total assets; NAF is non-audit 
fees (in RM) while LNAF is natural logarithm of non-audit fees; SEG is the 
number of business segments; ZFC is the Zmijewski score for financial crisis; 
ROA is net profit before tax over total assets; AQ an indicator variable equals 
to ‘1’ if the firm hires Big4 auditor and ‘0’ if otherwise; IND is the proportion of 
independent non-executive directors to audit committee; DIL is the number of 
meetings; EXP is the number of audit committee with accounting or finance 
qualification.
Model B introduces the audit committee characteristics IND, DIL 
and EXP. The results reported shows that external audit fees are positively 
and significantly associated with the audit committee independence (IND) 
and diligence (DIL) at p<0.01 and expertise (EXP) at p<0.1. Prior research 
recommends that stronger audit committee members demand for higher 
quality audits (Goodwin & Kent, 2006), and firms with strong governance 
practices engage in greater level of internal auditing and are connected 
with higher audit fees. Carcello et	al. (2002) argue that high quality board 
demands for more external monitoring from external auditors and are 
willing to pay higher audit fees. The signs for the control variables are all 
in predicted directions except for ROA. Following prior research (Simunic, 
1980; Francis & Simon, 1987; Craswell et	al., 1995) it is expected that the 
AF is positively associated with TA, NAF, SEG, ZFC, AQ, and all other 
variables remain significant with the exception of INST&MGRL.
Model C brings in the interaction variables, PCON which comprise 
of three Models I, II and III. Hypotheses 2a, 2b and 2c predict a significant 
relationship between AC characteristics, IND, DIL and EXP with audit 
fees for PCON firms as compared to INST&MGRL and FAMILY firms. 
The results indicate that the interaction term audit committee IND_PCON 
(p<0.1), DIL_PCON (p<0.01) and EXP_PCON (p<0.01) are significant, 
thus H2a, H2b and H2c are supported. It reveals that there is a significant 
positive association between the audit committee IND, DIL and EXP, and 
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audit fees for PCON as compared to INST&MGRL and FAMILY firms. This 
is because under the demand side perspective, audit committee members 
who are independent, diligent and with financial expertise demand for 
additional audit procedures from the external auditors especially for areas 
that subsequently reveal greater amounts of contention or risk, consequently 
higher audit fees. 
                       Table 5(b): Audit Fee Regression Models (n =567) 
Model C
I II III
Variable Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value
Constant 32.85 31.99 32.19
LTA 0.41 17.83*** 0.42 17.97*** 0.41 17.38***
TA 0.05 2.74*** 0.07 3.33*** 0.05 2.55***
LNAF 0.06 3.87*** 0.06 3.98*** 0.06 4.03***
NAF 0.08 3.65*** 0.09 4.07*** 0.07 3.09***
SEG 0.05 3.36*** 0.06 3.59*** 0.05 3.49***
ZFC 0.14 5.93*** 0.14 5.89*** 0.14 6.00***
ROA -0.04 -2.18*** -0.04 -2.12** 0.06 -1.77*
AQ 0.06 3.99*** 0.06 3.84*** 0.05 4.13***
INST&MGRL -0.07 -1.25 -0.13 -3.18 -0.12 -3.78***
FAMILY -0.04 -0.79 -0.11 -2.51** -0.15 -4.62***
IND -0.06 -3.34*** -0.05 -2.79* -0.04 -3.19***
DIL 0.07 4.56*** 0.02 0.56 0.08 5.12***
EXP -0.02 -1.31 -0.03 1.73 -0.00 1.49
IND_PCON 0.11 1.85*
DIL_PCON 0.24 4.20***
EXP_PCON 0.16 4.19***
F-statistic 219.05 223.18 223.86
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00
Adj. R² 0.82 0.82 0.83
 p< 0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01                      
 ºObservations having a zero for LNAF are re-corded to a small positive value 
(0.00001) to enable a logarithmic transformation.
Notes:  AF is audit fees while LAF is natural logarithm of audit fees; TA is total 
assets (in RM) while LTA is natural logarithm of total assets; NAF is non-audit 
fees (in RM) while LNAF is natural logarithm of non-audit fees; SEG is the 
number of business segments; ZFC is the Zmijewski score for financial crisis; 
97
Ownership structured Firms in malaysia: audit cOmmittee characteristics and audit Fees 
ROA is net profit before tax over total assets; AQ an indicator variable equals 
to ‘1’ if the firm hires Big4 auditor and ‘0’ if otherwise; IND is the proportion of 
independent non-executive directors to audit committee; DIL is the number of 
meetings; EXP is the number of audit committee with accounting or finance 
qualification.
Firms that are committed to strong corporate governance demand 
additional assurance from auditors and higher audit quality (Lifschutz et	
al., 2001), and are likely to engage in greater levels of internal auditing 
resulting in higher external audit fees (Goodwin & Kent, 2006). Increasing 
monitoring by audit committees also associated with increase in audit fees 
(Ismail et	al., 2012). According to Norziaton et	al. (2015), PCON firms have 
higher audit fees due to improved governance which demands an increase in 
audit effort. Further, the association between audit committee independence, 
diligence, and expertise and audit fee is significant, suggesting that PCON 
firms are committed to strong corporate governance and are prepared to 
pay a higher quality external audit work. This is because audit committee 
members who sit on PCON firm’s board demand for expanded audit scope in 
order to avoid being associated with financial misstatement and to preserve 
their reputational capital. Hence, the PCON firm’s audit committee members 
are committed to strong corporate governance practices. They are in place 
to monitor the management, who otherwise may act in their own personal 
best interest and not in the interest of the shareholders. Hence, it can be 
concluded that there is a marked improvement in corporate governance of 
PCON firms since it was then generally perceived to exhibit poor corporate 
governance, greater agency problems (Abdul Wahab et	al., 2009) and with 
high risks (Gul, 2006). 
CONCLUSION
This current study draws on the agency theory, where the separation of 
ownership and control between the owner and manager of a firm would 
subsequently lead to agency costs, such as audit fees. As managers may not 
act in the best interests of shareholders, monitoring by independent directors 
is crucial. The importance of the agency theory in corporate governance is 
further supported by the findings of this research, which applies an agency 
theory framework, that the improved internal governance mechanisms 
through enhanced audit committee characteristics increase the demand 
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for audit procedure resulting in higher audit fees. In addition, the political 
embeddedness perspective may also be pertinent to explain the corporate 
setting in Malaysia which examines the relationship between audit committee 
characteristics and external audit fees. It is predicted that the mandatory 
regulations on the audit committee characteristics are positively associated 
with higher external audit fees for PCON firms than INST&MGRL and 
FAMILY firms. The panel analysis of 567 firm’s year-observation for the 
years 2008 to 2010 reveals that positive association between audit committee 
IND, DIL and EXP, and external audit fees was evidenced for PCON firms. 
Clearly, this study shows that audit committee members have a duty not 
just to oversee the conduct of business in compliance with laws they should 
also be effective stewards and guardians of the firm in respect of ethical 
values, and to ensure an effective governance structure for the appropriate 
management of risks and level of internal controls. The enhanced corporate 
governance regime has been effective in that PCON firms still pay higher 
audit fees even though their internal governance mechanisms are stronger, 
indicating the dominance of the demand-side explanation. This observation 
strengthens claims that the corporate governance regulatory has indeed 
been effective. This study also facilitates to dispel the concerns regarding 
PCON firms in the corporate governance reform efforts as highlighted in 
the World Bank Report in 2012.
The present study has a number of limitations that should be noted, 
hence providing opportunities for further research. First, this study is based 
on the revamped BMLR in 2008 which emphasised on audit committee 
characteristics. Future research should examine the new changes in BMLR 
and their relation to audit fees. Second, this study’s sample comprises of 567 
firm’s year-observation public firms listed on Bursa Malaysia, excluding 
financial services sector. Hence, generalisation of the results to smaller 
firms, either public or private, may be inappropriate. It should examine the 
latest data from the Bursa Malaysia as it will reflect the current situation of 
ownership structure in Malaysia. A point to note as well, the current study 
did not distinguish between audit fees and non-audit fees; as it was not the 
focus of the research to ascertain these differences. It can be highlighted 
that future research may delve into non-audit services factors that may 
contribute to the auditor-client relationship.
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NOTE
1The Malaysian government’s implementation of capital controls in 1998 
was primarily to benefit political-connected firms that were hit by the Asian 
financial crisis in 1997.
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